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Efficacité dynamique des instruments de responsabilité élargie du producteur (REP) 
dans un modèle de simulation de dynamique industrielle 
Résumé 
Cet article propose une étude originale de l’impact de la responsabilité élargie du producteur 
sur les stratégies d’innovation des firmes et les structures de marché. Notre analyse est fondée 
sur le cadre stylisé de la prévention des déchets élaboré par Brouillat (2009a, b). Les produits 
y sont modélisés comme des technologies multi-caractéristiques dont l’évolution dépend des 
stratégies d’innovation des firmes ainsi que des interactions avec les consommateurs et les 
acteurs de la post-consommation (recyclage). Ce modèle de simulation multi-agents a été ici 
modifié en vue d’étudier les effets sur la dynamique industrielle des instruments de politique de 
prévention des déchets, et plus particulièrement leur impact sur les stratégies d’innovation des 
firmes ainsi que sur l’évolution des caractéristiques des produits et des structures de marché. 
Nous nous focalisons sur deux types d’instruments réglementaires  : la contribution au 
recyclage et la norme de recyclage. Plusieurs configurations d’un même type d’instrument sont 
considérées afin d’en étudier les effets sur la dynamique industrielle. La contribution 
principale de cet article est de montrer comment ce type de modèle de simulation peut être 
utilisé pour analyser l’impact des instruments de politique de prévention des déchets sur 
l’évolution technologique des produits, sur les stratégies d’innovation des firmes et sur 
l’évolution de leurs parts de marché. Introduire une politique environnementale dans un 
modèle de simulation multi-agents nous permet d’examiner plus en profondeur comment 
différentes configurations d’un même instrument réglementaire peuvent modifier la dynamique 
du système et, plus particulièrement, comment les incitations et contraintes liées aux 
instruments étudiés influencent les mécanismes de sélection à l’œuvre sur le marché. 
Mots-clés  : Prévention des déchets  ; dynamique industrielle  ; politique environnementale  ; 
modèle de simulation ; responsabilité élargie du producteur 
Dynamic efficiency of Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) instruments in a 
simulation model of industrial dynamics 
Abstract 
This paper presents an original approach to the impact of extended producer responsibility 
instruments for waste prevention upon firms' innovative strategies and market structure. Our 
analysis is based on a stylised framework of waste prevention developed in Brouillat (2009a, 
b). In this framework, products are modelled as multi-characteristic technologies whose 
evolution depends on firms' innovation strategies and on the interactions with consumers and 
post-consumption activities (recycling). This model has been adapted to explore the impact of 
waste prevention instruments upon industrial dynamics, and more particularly upon firms' 
innovative strategies and upon the evolution of products' characteristics and market structure. 
We focus on two types of policy instruments: recycling fees and norms. For each instrument, 
we will consider different policy designs in order to study their effects on industrial dynamics. 
The main contribution of this paper is to show how this type of simulation model can be used to 
explore the impact of waste prevention policy instruments on the technological evolution of 
products, on innovation strategy and on the evolution of firms' market shares. The introduction 
of policy instruments in a simulation agent-based model of industrial dynamics enables us to 
analyse more thoroughly how different policy designs can modify the dynamics of the system 
and, more particularly, how the incentives and the constraints linked to the policy instruments 
under consideration shape market selection. 
Keywords: waste prevention; industrial dynamics; environmental policy; simulation model; 
extended producer responsibility  
JEL: O33, D21, Q53 
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1. Introduction 
This paper presents an original approach to the impact of environmental policy 
instruments for waste prevention upon firms' innovative strategies and market structure. 
Today waste prevention and reduction is a core aspect of extended producer responsibility 
(EPR). The basic principle of EPR is to place some responsibility for environmental impact of 
product's end-of-life on the original producer and seller of that product. The thinking behind 
this approach is that it will provide incentives for producers to make design changes to 
products that would reduce waste management costs (OECD, 2006). The literature on EPR 
generally assumes that any form of EPR will provide incentives to firms to change their 
products and practices towards eco-design, but there is little conceptual thinking on how such 
incentives work through the system (OECD, 2006). Models on EPR instruments generally 
assume that producers choose material inputs and the level of output to maximize profits and 
that consumers choose how much to consume, recycle and throw away so as to maximize 
utility subject to budget constraints. A majority of models assume perfect competition on the 
output market, and do not endogenize recycling activities nor R&D activities and innovation 
in eco-design
1. Within this literature, the focus is on the impact of EPR instruments on social 
welfare and so on the role of economic instruments and prices in order to provide optimal 
incentives to firms and to consumers for reducing the environmental effects of post-consumer 
products to the optimal level (see for example, Palmer and Walls (1997); Fullerton and Wu 
(1998); Calcott and Walls (2005)). Yet the main objective of EPR is to promote innovation 
and to stimulate producers to design products that are more environmentally compatible (i.e. 
design for the environment). As pointed out by Kneese and Schulze (1975), besides the issue 
of static efficiency, the extent to which policy instruments spur new technology 'toward the 
efficient conservation of environment' is one of the most important criteria on which to 
evaluate the efficiency of environmental policy instruments. This argument is particularly true 
in the case of EPR instruments. But in order to be able to discuss the dynamic efficiency of 
EPR policy instruments, one need to take into account learning mechanisms, as well as 
uncertainty and path-dependency phenomena characterizing innovation activities (Dosi, 
1988). In other words, an analysis of the impact of EPR instruments on firms' capacity to 
innovate implies to endogenize firms' R&D and eco-design activities. This is the main 
purpose of this article which explores the dynamic efficiency of two different EPR policy 
instruments i.e. recycling fees and norms, in an agent based simulation model in which 
technological progress is driven by an endogenous stochastic innovation process relying on 
firms' R&D strategy.  
The model is based on a stylised framework of waste prevention developed in Brouillat 
(2009a, b). In this framework, products are modelled as multi-characteristic technologies 
whose evolution depends on firms' innovation strategies and on the interactions with 
consumers and post-consumption activities (recycling). Brouillat (2009a, b) develops a micro-
simulation model enabling to study the dynamics of waste prevention and the development of 
green products through dynamic stochastic processes involving multiple compromises and 
trade-offs between the different dimensions of products i.e. technological performances, 
recyclability and competitiveness. The main contributions of this model are to introduce 
recyclability as a characteristic of products, to study the interactions with the other 
characteristics and to integrate endogenous recycling activities and raw materials flows.  
                                                 
1 For a survey, see Walls (2004) and OECD (2006). Dynamic efficiency of Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) instruments … 
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In this paper, we use the same model in order to explore the impact of waste prevention 
instruments upon industrial dynamics, and more particularly upon firms' innovative strategies 
and upon the evolution of products' characteristics and market structure. The main 
contribution of the paper is to model EPR policy instruments in a complex adaptive system 
composed of three types of interacting agents i.e. producers, consumers and recyclers, and 
whose evolution is based on a stochastic and path-dependent innovation process. The 
introduction of policy instruments in such simulation agent-based models of industrial 
dynamics enables us to analyse more thoroughly how different instruments and designs can 
modify the dynamics of the system and, more particularly, how the incentives and the 
constraints linked to the considered policy instruments shape market selection and innovation. 
Moreover, this is done in a bounded rationality context à la Simon in which agents facing 
uncertainty are not able to optimize expected profits. Our purpose is to test in such context the 
relative dynamic efficiency of recycling fees and norms. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the model. In section 3 we 
present some simulation results and we compare the effects of different policy instrument 
settings on innovation and selection. In section 4 we draw some final conclusions. 
2. Recycling fees and norms in a model of industrial 
dynamics 
2.1. Basic structure of the model 
Before describing the model, a warning note is required. Our goal is to build a model 
that can provide us with generic lessons about the impact of EPR policy instruments on the 
development of eco-products. The purpose is to shed light on the conditions and the 
mechanisms driving change in firms' innovation strategy and the associated shift to green or 
eco-products. Our results must be considered as indicative rather than as predictive. Real 
world markets are so complex that, even if we were able to build a good approximation of one 
of them, we would face the same problems of generalization than with real data. 
The structure of the model is based on “history-friendly modelling" developed by 
Malerba et al. (1999, 2007, 2008). We use the same kind of topography to characterize 
products and the way of modelling innovation and market dynamics is very similar. However, 
our model is not a history-friendly model, in the sense that we do not aim at generating 
stylized facts to reproduce the dynamic of a given industry. Our approach is rather 
counterfactual in the sense that we aim at exploring the properties of a virtual industrial 
system, which is modelled as a complex adaptive system, under different condition settings. 
The model is based on a previous work on firms’ economic incentives to extend product 
lifetime and recyclability of products (Brouillat, 2009a, b). However, this model has been 
adapted in order to address the policy question under examination. In this section, we will 
highlight these modifications. Given the complexity of agent-based models, it is impossible to 
present in details all the equations without confusing the reader and obscuring the basic logic 
of the model. We will therefore describe in transparent form what we regard as the central 
ideas of the simulation model
2. 
We consider the market of a generic durable product. We take into account three 
categories of actors: firms producing and marketing a single finished product (i)
3, end 
                                                 
2 Interested readers may obtain a full copy of the simulation model by writing to the authors. 
3 Consequently, i represents the product as well as the producer. Dynamic efficiency of Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) instruments … 
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consumers buying those products, and recyclers recovering and recycling end-of-life products 
used by consumers. These three categories of agents interact at the various stages of the 
model. There is no entry of new agent in the model. 
- Product space 
An important aspect of the model is the topography of the products' space. Every 
product is modelled in a Lancasterian way that is as a vector of three characteristics which 
determine its quality level. These three characteristics are recyclability (R), durability (LT) 
and technical quality (X). X reflects the “conventional” quality of products. It is a multi-
criterion dimension reflecting the performance of the technical attributes during the use phase. 
X is a synthetic index which increases in proportion to the overall technical quality of the 
product.  
For each characteristic, we assume outer limits which delimit the achievable potential 
with the existing design of products. It was presumed that there is a maximum recyclability 
threshold (Rmax1), a lifetime threshold (LTmax1) as well as a maximum technical quality 
(Xmax) defining the technological frontier on each dimension. For analytic convenience, we 
treat those technological constraints as defining rectangular boxes in a three dimensions space 
(cf. figure 1). Thus the 'boxes' in figure 1 depict the set of technological characteristics that 
can potentially be achieved in product design. This means that firms' innovative activities will 
be carried out within this product space. 







The distinction between incremental and radical innovation is important to discuss the 
dynamic efficiency of EPR policy instruments. EPR approaches could lead to no innovation, 
incremental innovation or radical innovation. Both types of innovation may decrease energy 
and materials consumption and increase the recyclability of products. Even if it is difficult to 
distinguish between what constitutes incremental and radical innovation, we propose to define 
incremental innovations as innovations bringing improvements in product characteristics 
within the boundaries of the existing product design space (Rmax1 and LTmax1), whereas 
radical innovations enable firms to exceed the thresholds by radically modifying the design of 
their products. This is consistent with the definition given by Stevens (2004) according to 
which "radical innovation would be in the holistic approach of design for the environment". 
Green product design includes designing products in their entirety that can be easily 
upgraded, rather than replaced, or that can be easily disassembled for reuse or recycling 
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(LTmax1) represent the maximum recyclability and lifetime reachable through incremental 
innovations, while radical innovations enable firms to exceed those thresholds. In other 
words, a radical innovation in the design of product opens new technological opportunities 
and push technological boundaries up to (Rmax2) and to (LTmax2). So in terms of 
environmental performances, radical innovations in product design open a new potential of 
improvement in the recyclability and lifetime of products, which can be conducive (if 
efficiently exploited by firms) in the long run to a significant decrease in waste streams and 
virgin material flows.  
- Innovation process and R&D strategy 
Figure 1 represents the product space in which each firm will progress (thanks to its 
innovative activities) along a specific technological trajectory. Every firm tries to improve the 
quality of its product on one or several dimensions in order to make it more attractive towards 
consumers. These improvements and the direction of firm’s trajectory will depend on its R&D 
strategy.  
The model integrates an endogenous process of knowledge accumulation and 
innovation. At each period, every firm invests in R&D a fixed proportion of its profits of the 
previous period. The R&D investment seeks to improve the quality of products. Such a rise in 
product quality will give the firm an opportunity to increase its market share. R&D 
investment (RD) is divided into expenditure aiming at increasing the product technical quality 
(RD
X), the lifetime (RD
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The successive R&D investments allow accumulating knowledge (S) about each of the 
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with the parameter  (0    1) determining the speed at which the level of knowledge fits 
the R&D expenditure of the current period. 
This accumulated knowledge will be used to innovate: for each firm, the level of 
knowledge determines the probabilities of access to new values within product space. Access 
probabilities to a new technical performance are logistic functions of the knowledge level 
reached in terms of technical quality (S
X). The same applies to both dimensions LT and R 
using the knowledge level reached in terms of product lifetime (S
LT) and recyclability (S
R). 
The innovation process involves increasing the value of at least one of the three product's 
characteristics according to Cobb Douglas functions. For example, the improvement of the 
technical quality is given by: Dynamic efficiency of Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) instruments … 







    ) E .( X Xmax . S . X t , i t , i
X
t , i X t , i  (3) 
This equation implies that the increase in technical quality depends on the knowledge 
level reached in this dimension (S
X), the distance of the achieved design to the frontier (Xmax 
– X) and the cumulated experience (E) (i.e. the number of periods that the firm has been 
working with a particular product design). The same applies to product lifetime and 
recyclability
4. The effect of the distance to the frontier implies that when the level of a given 
product characteristic comes closer and closer to the limit of what is achievable with the 
considered product design, a given R&D expenditure will achieve less and less further 
progress (traditional effect of depletion of technological opportunities).  
In the present model, firms' R&D strategies may change over time in order to fit their 
behaviour to the fluctuations of the market environment
5. Firms’ innovative strategies are 
then characterized by a learning process in the form of two operators, imitation and mutation 
(Silverberg and Verspagen, 1995). The learning process is divided into two steps. The first 
step determines if the firm wants to change its R&D strategy, while the second fixes the new 
strategy. This learning is based on a Simonian approach of bounded rationality so that firms 
take their decisions according to satisficing rules: only the firms with unsatisfactory profit 
levels will choose to change their strategy. Firms will decide then to change their R&D 
strategy with probabilities proportional to their gross profits (П) and the best and the worst 











t t , i Change
t , i min max
min
. k ob Pr 1  (4) 
Parameter k is the maximal probability. Thus, the more profitable a firm is, the less 
likely it will change its strategy. If the draw is a success, the firm will review its R&D 
strategy; if not, the firm retains its strategy from the previous period. 
Once the firm has decided to change its strategy, two possibilities arise: 
–  The first one consists in imitating the strategy of a competitor. The firm randomly 
selects a firm in the economy with probabilities proportional to firms' market share. 
Once the firm has chosen the competitor to imitate, it adopts the strategy of this firm 




–  The second possibility consists in selecting a new strategy without taking into account 
the behaviour of the other firms (mutation). The firm will draw from a normal 
distribution and alter the value of its variables δ
X, δ
LT and δ
R within the admissible 
range [0,1]
6. 
As explained in the description of the product space, when a firm crosses the boundaries 
Rmax1 and/or LTmax1, it implies a change in the product design which corresponds to what 
we call a radical innovation. We assume that such change in product design requires a 
transition period over which the firm will face additional fixed costs (a kind of switching 
cost). These costs will be borne by firms over several periods following radical innovation 
and consequently, it will lower profits
7. Net profits are then equal to gross profits minus the 
fixed costs due to the change in product design. These net profits play the role of financial 
constraint by determining the budget allocated to R&D. 
                                                 
4 This formulation is inspired from Malerba and al. (1999, 2007). 
5 The evolution of R&D strategy is a new aspect of the model comparatively to Brouillat (2009a, b). 
6 The firm will randomly choose between imitation and mutation with probabilities proportional to its imitation 
propensity. We assume that imitation propensity is a parameter identical for all the firms. 
7 Additional costs and the duration of payment are identical for all the firms. Dynamic efficiency of Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) instruments … 
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Moreover radical innovation entails another effect that we call 'experience destroying 
effect' linked to the decrease to zero in the experience variable (E) (cf. equation 3). This effect 
is due to the fact that a radical innovation involves a complete change in the product design 
(design for environment), so that the experience developed with the old product design counts 
for little or nothing when the firm shifts to the new eco-design. But in the meantime, radical 
innovation opens new technological opportunities to firms since it pushes the boundaries to 
Rmax2 and LTmax2, so that the distance to the technological frontier increases which will pull 
up the potential improvements in product quality. To summarize, radical innovations benefit 
to firms in terms of dynamic efficiency in the long run (i.e. it opens new technological 
opportunities), while in the short run they entail constraining effects for firms in terms of 
fixed costs and experience.  
- Demand side 
The demand for products is expressed as a demand for specific product characteristics 
in a Lancasterian vein. A simple formulation of consumer preferences is based on the 
following visibility function. We assume that each consumer uses one single product at the 
same time and renews its purchase only when this product is at the end of its lifetime or when 
it becomes obsolete. The rule to choose a new product is random, with probabilities 




















 t , i t , i
t , i
t , i
t , i t , i MS . R ~ .
p
T L ~
. X V    (5) 
The visibility of the product is a specification of its total performance, i.e. in terms of its 
characteristics and market share. This function implies that visibility increases with the 
quality of the product and decreases with its selling price (p). Furthermore, the relative 
increase in visibility is a weighted average of the relative increases in each attribute. 
Parameters β1, β2 and β3 represent sensitivity of the visibility respectively to technical quality, 
product use cost (LT/p: price per period of use) and recyclability. MS is the market share of 
the firm and the parameter β4 reflects the bandwagon effect (Lebeinstein, 1976). The 
parameters β1, β2, β3 and β4 represent, then, the consumer’s preferences with respect to the 
product’s characteristics
9. Malerba et al. (2007) suppose that a certain section of consumers 
have a strong preference for one product characteristic (“experimental users”). In the same 
way, we assume that a certain section of consumers called “green consumers” have a strong 
preference for environmental characteristics of products. In fact, in developed countries, an 
increasing attention towards environmental issues can be observed, making responsible 
consumption a critical choice for many individuals, but not by all. Green consumers pay 
greater attention to product recyclability (β1 < β3) while non-green consumers are more 
interested in its technical performance (β1 > β3). 
We assume that consumers cannot perfectly know the environmental quality of products 
and cannot estimate perfectly reliability of products. Consequently, we assume that 
consumers' decisions are based upon their own perceptions of the recyclability and lifetime of 
products ( T L
~ and  R
~) and that these perceptions result from random draws in a normal 
distribution centred on the actual values. 
As to the replacement of products, we assume that consumers can renew their product 
(before its end of life) when it is still in working order because the technical characteristics of 
                                                 
8 This function is based on the utility function of Malerba et al. (1999). 
9 We assume that β1 + β2 + β3 + β4 = 1 Dynamic efficiency of Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) instruments … 
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this product do not satisfy their expectations anymore. The modelling of these renewal 
decisions is based on obsolescence probabilities depending on the technical quality (X) of the 
products currently used by consumers in the current period. The higher the technical quality 
of the product, the less likely it will be considered as obsolete. Thus, consumer j will replace 












t t , j
j
Obs
t , j MinX MaxX
MinX X
. x prob 1  (6) 
Xj is the technical quality of the product owned by consumer j, MinX and MaxX are the 
best and the worst technical quality (X) of the products currently used by consumers on the 
market in the current period and x is a parameter reflecting the maximum obsolescence 
probability
10. 
At the end of the purchase cycle, each firm counts the number of sales (Q) and the 
number of lost users (LOST) and consequently determines the current number of users of that 
product, i.e. its stock of customers (U): 
t , i t , i t , i t , i LOST Q U U    1  (7) 













Regarding the exit process, we assume that firms will decide to leave the market if they 
cannot face their production costs over a too large number of consecutive periods. In our 
simulations, we consider that firms will exit the market if they make losses (negative net 
profits) over a least ten consecutive periods. 
- Firms-recycler interactions 
We assume that manufacturing products requires two categories of substitutable inputs: 
recycled inputs and virgin inputs
11. Thus, to produce the quantity Q, the firm i needs a 
quantity ωi.Q of recycled inputs and a quantity (1 - ωi).Q of virgin inputs. Parameter ωi 
represents the share of recycled inputs constituting the product (0 ≤ ωi ≤ 1). Recycled inputs 
are provided by recyclers, virgin inputs by suppliers external to the model.  
The recycler is the main actor within the post-consumption phase. To simplify, we are 
assuming that there is just one single recycler in the economy. This agent will represent all the 
downstream actors in the supply chain. She collects the complete range of end of life products 
which she recycles, depending on the recyclability (R) of these products
12, and sells to the 
firms as recycled inputs
13. Recycled inputs are then available in limited quantities. We note, 
respectively qr and qv the quantities of recycled and virgin inputs bought by the firm from the 
recycler and virgin inputs suppliers to manufacture the quantity Q. If the recycler provides a 
sufficient quantity of recycled inputs to face the demand, each firm buys the desired quantity 
of recycled inputs (qr = ω.Q). But, if the available quantities of recycled inputs are not 
                                                 
10 Consumers owning a product with the highest performance will have an obsolescence probability equal to 
zero, those owning a product with the lowest performance will have the maximum probability x. 
11 We are actually supposing that virgin inputs can be used as substitutes for recycled inputs. 
12 Starting from a unit of end of life product, the recycler manufactures and sells R units of recycled inputs. 
13 We are assuming that the part which cannot be recycled is incinerated or stocked in a waste disposal site. Dynamic efficiency of Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) instruments … 
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sufficient to feed the demand, firms will buy in an additional quantity of virgin materials to 
face the recycled inputs shortage
14. qr and qv enter in the calculation of product price. 
The price of a product is defined as the product unit cost of production from the previous 
period (CM) to which the firm adds a fixed mark-up (λ): 








    
t , i
t , i t , i
t , i t , i Q
qv . pv qr . pr
. CM . 1 p  (9) 
λ is identical for all the firms so that there is no price strategy in the model. Firms compete on 
product innovation and their strategy only focus on the distribution choice of R&D 
expenditure. pr is the price of recycled inputs and pv the price of virgin inputs. pv is exogenic, 
fixed by virgin inputs suppliers. By simplification, we assume that pr is also fixed
15. 
At each period, the recycler invests in R&D a fixed proportion of its profits of the 
previous period in order to increase the quality of its recycled materials and to lower its 
marginal production cost
16. The modelling of R&D investment and innovation process of the 
recycler is based on the same principles than the one of firms.  
Improvements in recycled materials quality will increase the demand for this type of 
inputs, i.e. the share of recycled inputs constituting products (ω) will increase for all the firms 
on the market. Improvements in production efficiency of the recycling process will lead to 
lower the marginal production cost of the recycler and then will contribute to increase its 
profits. Figure 2 summarizes the model structure and the interactions among agents. 
 














                                                 
14 Consequently, we assume that there is no constraint in the quantity of virgin inputs. 
15 There is no fixed condition on the value for pv and pr. pv can be higher, lower or identical to pr. 
16 We have to notice that the production cost of the recycler is characterized by large fixed costs because 
recycling activities requires a large capital stock (machines, infrastructure, etc.). 
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2.2. Modelling recycling fees and norms 
The main contribution of this model is to simulate the impact of two EPR policy 
instruments in a model in which the dynamics is mainly driven by an endogenous stochastic 
process of innovation.  
We assume that public authorities set a regulatory framework aiming to turn market 
dynamics towards better environmental performance, i.e. lowering quantities of waste and 
increasing recycling rates. Nevertheless, the decision-making process guiding the 
implementation of regulation is not endogenous to the model. We only consider the 
introduction of policy instruments, which are exogenously designed, and study their effects 
upon the dynamics of the simulated system. We assume that public authorities are fully 
informed about the performance level of firms and so are able to control and to monitor them 
to ensure that regulation is fully respected. 
EPR encompasses a range of instruments which will be analysed in terms of their 
innovative effects. As usual in environmental policy analysis, two main types of instruments 
can be distinguished: regulatory instruments (take-back requirements, recyclability norms and 
product standards) and economic instruments (deposit/refund schemes, advance disposal or 
recycling fees, material taxes, pollution charges and subsidies). Take-back requirements are 
the primary EPR instrument. They require producers or retailers to take back the product or its 
packaging after use. They are often associated with targets for collection and recycling and 
have been applied to a wide range of products (OECD, 2006). Take-back mandates are often 
associated to other instruments, in particular advance disposal or recycling fees and recycling 
norms. These two instruments are introduced in the model.  
- Recycling fees 
In order to cope with take-back and recycling responsibility, producers have two 
options: either they develop internally some processes for the disposal and the recycling of 
end of life products, either they sub-contract these activities to eco-organizations or to 
recycling firms. Generally, firms prefer this last solution since the internal development of 
recycling systems involves high financial and organizational investments (Mayers, 2007). 
Thus in most cases, take-back mandates take the form of "advanced recycling fees" which are 
paid by firms to recycling organizations. A recycling fee is generally a tax assessed on 
product sales and used to cover the cost of recycling. The calculation and the distribution of 
recycling fees can follow different principles
17. The main issue is to determine who is going 
to pay the tax: producers or consumers? If producers are required to pay the fees, they may 
have the incentive to try to reduce the fees instead of redesigning their products (Stevens, 
2004). If consumers pay, it may have a significant impact on price but not on product 
innovation. Another important point concerns the reward effect linked to recycling fees. In 
OECD (2006), Walls emphasizes that it is essential that the reward is linked to efforts on part 
of individual producer not to industry-wide effect.  
In order to take into account these different effects, we consider different designs of 
recycling fees. We assume that for each sale, firms are required to pay the recycler for the 
recycling of their products. As to the calculation of the recycling fee, we study two cases. In 
the first case, we model a single fee homogeneous for all the firms: the fee is proportional to 
the average recyclability of products on the market. In that case, the fee depends on the 
industry wide effort on recyclability: 
                                                 
17 For a survey on these policy instruments, see for example OECD (2006).  Dynamic efficiency of Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) instruments … 






























In the second case, the fee is specific to firms, i.e. proportional to the recyclability of the 
















The parameter FeeRate is the minimum value for the recycling fee. The fee is in the 
meantime an extra cost for firms and an additional financial resource for the recycler. As 
already mentioned, this cost can also be supported by consumers. Indeed in order to prevent a 
drop in firms’ profits, authorities could permit firms to integrate the fee into their product 
price (Clift and France, 2006). In this case, consumers will pay for the recycling of their 
product.  
So, we consider four types of design for this instrument: 
-  Homogeneous recycling fees paid by consumers (HC). 
-  Homogeneous recycling fees paid by firms (HF). 
-  Firm specific recycling fees paid by consumers (SC). 
-  Firm specific recycling fees paid by firms (SF). 
- Recycling norms 
Product take-back mandates are often associated to recycling rate targets. For example, 
the government may require that each producer meets a recycling rate goal of, says, 75%. In 
Europe, many packaging laws work in this way and material-specific recycling rate targets or 
norms are set (OECD, 2006). These instruments can stimulate product innovations as well as 
increased recycling and reuse of products. But as emphasized notably by Ashford (2000, 
2002), the impact of every policy instruments depends on its design and in particular on its 
stringency. In the case of recyclability norms, stringency depends on the level of the norm as 
well as on the mechanisms of control and penalties in case of non-compliance.  
Concerning the calculation of the level of the recyclability norm (Rmin), we assume that 
it is set by applying a parameter NormRate to the highest product recyclability on the market 
(MaxR) when the norm is introduced. It means that we assume that the norm is fixed 
according to the best technology in terms of recyclability available on the market: 
START t MaxR . NormRate min R    (11) 
with 0 < NormRate  1. 
Then we consider two policy designs characterized by different stringency levels: 
–  The most stringent norms (Norm1) require that all products on the market provide an 
environmental performance at least equal to that required by the norm. After the 
introduction of the norm, only the products which comply with this requirement will 
be considered suitable for sale. The products providing a recyclability level lower than Dynamic efficiency of Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) instruments … 
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Rmin will not be allowed to be marketed (case Norm1). In that case, the norm really 
plays as a selection mechanism.  
–  We will also study a less stringent regulation (Norm2): firms not satisfying the norm 
will be asked to pay a fine, as the environmental performance of their product is below 
this standard. The calculation of the fine is based on the average firm profits: 












FineRate is a parameter reflecting the stringency of the fine (0 < FineRate  1).  
By varying the characteristics of norms, we can consider different policy designs, in 
particular in terms of stringency, and study how it affects industrial dynamics. Both policy 
instruments with their different designs are evaluated on the basis of the simulation results 
presented in section 3. 
2.3. Objectives and dynamic efficiency of policy instruments  
The first step in designing and implementing an efficient policy is clarifying the 
environmental objective of the policy. The problem with EPR instruments is that they are 
supposed to achieve several objectives: waste diversion, reduced environmental impact from 
production, less use of virgin materials in production and reduced toxicity of products. 
However one policy instrument cannot achieve all of these goals. As emphasized by Walls 
(2004), the primary objective if EPR policy should be to reduce the volume of solid waste 
disposal, while promoting recycling is seen as a mean of cost-effectively reducing waste 
disposal. “Likewise, encouraging producers to design for environment is a means to an end 
and not an end itself”, (Walls, 2004, page 28).  
In our model, the environmental objectives of EPR instruments are fixed according to 
this scheme, by considering that the priority is to decrease the volume of non-recycled waste 
as well as the use of virgin materials. Consequently, the environmental objectives of EPR 
instruments are primarily linked to two variables, which are the quantity of virgin materials 
flows used in the industry and what we call the “recycling rate” of waste which is calculated 
as the amount of recycled waste over total waste streams. Virgin materials flows are expected 
to decrease while recycling rate is expected to increase when an EPR policy instrument is 
introduced.  
The literature of environmental policy instruments tends to show that economic 
instruments are more advantageous than regulatory instruments in terms of (static) cost 
efficiency. But as outlined by Requate (2005), the extent to which policy instruments spur 
both R&D and the adoption of environmentally-friendly technology is one of the most 
important criteria on which to judge the performance of policy instruments. This capacity to 
stimulate a dynamic process of knowledge development and innovation is what is called the 
dynamic efficiency of instruments. In the case of EPR instruments, dynamic efficiency mainly 
concerns the capacity of the instrument to encourage producers to innovate and to design their 
product for environment. In our model, the dynamic efficiency of policy instruments can be 
evaluated through the change in firms' R&D strategy (share of R&D invested in recyclability), 
as well as through their capacity to innovate and to increase the recyclability of their products 
and to change their product design (radical innovation). To summarize, we can say that in our 
model the dynamic efficiency of policy instruments is related to the capacity of each 
instrument to provide incentives to firms to change their products towards eco-design and to Dynamic efficiency of Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) instruments … 
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progress in the long run in the product space.  
The question of dynamic efficiency is often discussed in relation to the Schumpeterian 
trade-off between innovation and monopoly power. The literature shows that in strongly 
cumulative markets, there is a strong tendency towards concentration and some sort of 'natural 
monopoly' linked to innovation. This tendency can be overcome by antitrust policy, but this 
"may create a new policy problem since a reduction in market power […] might be associated 
with a reduction in the rate of technical change because the size of leading firm is greatly 
reduced and investments in R&D are lower; consequently technological advance is reduced" 
(Malerba et al., 2008, page 375). In our model, the Schumpeterian trade-off is quite active 
since market dynamics is highly cumulative: the innovation process is path-dependent and 
cumulative (cf. equation 3), and market demand includes a bandwagon effect (cf. equation 5) 
which reinforces cumulativeness. Even if the question of market competition is not crucial in 
our article, the impact of EPR instruments must also be evaluated in terms of market 
efficiency i.e. their effects upon concentration. Through simulation, we will explore how the 
introduction of some EPR policy instruments may affect market dynamics and so the 
tendency towards concentration. As a matter of fact, policy instruments can influence the 
selection environment and so the evolution of firms' market shares (which in turn shapes their 
capacity to innovate). For that reason, EPR policy instruments will also be evaluated in terms 
of their market efficiency by considering their effects upon concentration, price as well as 
upon firms' profits and exit rate.  
In summary, EPR instruments will be evaluated and compared according to three types 
of criteria: environmental efficiency, dynamic efficiency and market efficiency (summarized 
in table 1).  
Table 1. Efficiency criteria and objectives of EPR instruments 
Efficiency criteria  Objectives 
Environmental efficiency 
 
- To decrease the total quantity of virgin materials 
used 
- To increase in the share of recycled waste 
Dynamic efficiency 
- To provide incentives to R&D on recyclability 
- To increase product recyclability 
- To stimulate changes in product design (radical 
innovation) 
Market efficiency 
- To control the impact of EPR instruments on 
market concentration, price, firms' profits and 
failure rate 
3. Dynamic efficiency of EPR policy instruments: 
simulation results 
As emphasized by many authors, in particular Ashford (2000, 2002), the effects of 
policy instruments upon innovation depend more on the policy design than on the type of 
instruments. That is to say that a given policy instrument may have different effects according 
to the way it is implemented, and more particularly according to its stringency versus 
flexibility and its time frame. It is within this perspective that we consider different rules or 
designs for each instrument.  
Two types of complementary results will be sequentially presented and examined in this 
section. First, we will study the dynamics of the system using one single simulation run. This 
simulation exercise is useful to explore and to understand the phenomena unfolding during 
the virtual history of a simulation run. It will enable us to investigate step by step firms’ Dynamic efficiency of Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) instruments … 
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trajectories as a result of the interplay of market dynamics and technological change. It will 
also cast light on the impact of regulation on these trajectories, on market structure and 
aggregated environmental variables. 
In a second step, we will explore the properties of the model with a wide range of 
parameter settings. The purpose is to see if we can identify some emergent properties and 
results which can be considered as valid for the whole set of parameters. To this end, we will 
present the results coming from a battery of 10000 simulations carried out with a Monte Carlo 
procedure. This methodology enables us to run a high number of simulations with a random 
setting of the initial values of the parameters of the model (Table 1 in appendix presents the 
chosen domain for the most important parameters). It is a way of exploring the space of 
parameters and of emphasizing the variety of the possible outcomes of the model without an 
arbitrary initialization of the parameters. In particular, it will enable us to test the effects of 
regulation parameters on the model dynamics and to hold out general proposition about the 
impact of policy instruments on the market. This will be done in the last section through 
regression trees which emphasizes the most influential parameters of EPR policy designs.  
3.1. Exploring one simulation run: firms’ trajectories and effects of 
policy instruments 
In this simulation experiment, we formalized initially 8 firms, 1000 consumers and one 
recycler. Table 2 in appendix presents the chosen values for the main parameters. We run 7 
simulations (corresponding to the six considered policy designs plus the case without 
regulation) that we will compare regarding different variables
18. We run the first simulation 
without any regulation, and then one run for each policy instrument (Norm1, Norm2, HC, HF, 
SC and SF). Figure 3 and 4 presents the results of the simulation run. 
The results emphasize the impact of policy instruments on the evolution of the recycling 
rate and on the total quantities of virgin materials used (figure 3). It clearly appears that it is 
the most stringent norm (Norm1) which has the highest environmental impact, since it 
decreases significantly the quantities of virgin materials and increases the share of recycled 
waste. These effects are much more moderate with Norm2 which confirms that stringency 
significantly influences the environmental efficiency of norms. As to the effects of recycling 
fees, they are more contrasted and very dependent on the design of the instrument. The 
recycling rate is significantly higher when the fee is specific and paid by consumers (SC), 
whereas the other designs have no effect. The impact on the use of virgin materials is also 
more important when the fee is paid by consumers than when it is paid by firms. 
The dynamic efficiency of each policy design can be approached by looking at the 
trajectories of firms within the product space (figure 4). It is striking to observe that the only 
cases in which some firms succeed in exploiting efficiently the product space by completely 
changing their product design and improving recyclability up to the maximum are Norm1 and 
SC. The difference between both cases is the fact that with Norm1, the best innovative firms 
also increase the lifetime of their products
19, whereas radical innovations only concern 
recyclability with SC. The same configuration hold for Norm2 with 3 firms capable of 
changing their product design, but with a recyclability level lower than the one reached with 
Norm1 and SC. As to the cases with homogeneous recycling fees (HC and HF), the 
technological trajectories of firms are not significantly modified comparatively to the case 
without regulation, which suggests that the dynamic efficiency of those policy designs is very 
                                                 
18 The number of periods for each simulation is set to 500. Policy instruments are introduced at t = 100. 
19 For a discussion of the relative role of recyclability and lifetime of products, see Brouillat (2009a).  Dynamic efficiency of Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) instruments … 
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low. 
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   The results also stress the link between the technological trajectory of firms and their 
capacity to survive on the market. If we look at individual trajectories, we can observe that in 
the case of Norm1, 4 firms over 8 are not able to comply with the norm and so exit the 
industry (see table 3 on failure in Appendix). In the long run, only 3 firms survive which 
explains the trend towards concentration observed on figure 3. In the case of Norm2, 5 firms 
exit the industry because they cannot bear the costs linked either to the fine either to the 
radical change in product design (switching costs). The evolution of the Herfindahl index 
clearly shows that the trend towards concentration is higher in the case of norms than in the 
case without regulation or with recycling fees. The results underlie that the Schumpeterian 
trade-off, which is active in the model because of cumulativeness and path-dependency of 
innovation, is reinforced by the introduction of norms. Recycling norms act as selection 
mechanisms which strengthen market selection and, in the long run, lead to concentrated 
oligopolistic structures (cf. figure 3). In the case of recycling fees, the evolution of market 
concentration is not significantly modified.  
3.2. Comparison of policy designs: simulation results with Monte-
Carlo procedure 
The results presented in table 2 show the impact of the six policy designs considered 
upon the different variables linked to respectively environmental, dynamic and market 
efficiency.  
The results presented in table 2 are the average value of the selected variables and the 
results of the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney U test: for each instrument, we compare the 
distribution of each variable with its distribution without regulation (WR)
20.  
Globally the results confirm the trends observed in the representative simulation run 
presented in the previous section. If we first look at each type of instrument separately, 
regarding fees, we can observe that the highest environmental efficiency is reached with 
specific recycling fees paid by consumers (SC). When the fee is paid by firms, because of cost 
constraints, firms have lower profits and so invest less in R&D, which is conducive in the 
long run to a lower recyclability of products in comparison with the case without regulation. 
If we concentrate on dynamic efficiency, we can observe a significant positive effect only 
when the fees are individualized, i.e. specific to firms (SC and SF). In that case, firms invest 
more R&D on product recyclability, while there is no significant effect when recycling fees 
are homogenous. This result emphasizes the importance of the policy design and, more 
particularly, of the rewards and incentives mechanisms. An individualized system of 
recycling fees enables to reward firms according to the recyclability of their products (the 
higher the recyclability, the lower the recycling fee), which gives them an incentive to 
innovate. These results are coherent with the empirical study of Clift and France (2006) which 
stress that usual take-back systems weaken the incentive effects of this policy, since the most 
recyclable goods have to support the same recycling fee than the least recyclable ones. It also 
confirms what is argued by Stevens (2004) according to which it is essential “to have the 
reward linked directly to efforts on the part of the individual producer and not industry-wide 
effects”.  
 
                                                 
20 Using a significance threshold of 5%, a probability lower than 0,05 means that the values of the two compared 
samples are different.  Dynamic efficiency of Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) instruments … 
  - 19 -




























































































































































































































































































































































































The first row reports the Monte Carlo average value and the second row the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney p-value 
performed on the sample pooled across Monte Carlo simulations
We can stress that a specific fee paid by consumers seems to be the best instrument 
since it is the only one which entails an increase in product recyclability. Nevertheless we also 
observe that this positive effect on recyclability is achieved at the detriment of the two other 
product characteristics on which firms do less R&D. It means that firm specific recycling fees 
act as focusing devices leading firms to reallocate their R&D investment. 
But whatever the policy design, our simulation results also show that a recycling fee 
cannot encourage firms to radically change their product design. As shown in table 2, the 
proportion of firms changing the design of their products towards design for recycling and/or 
durability does not significantly increase whatever the recycling fee system, except the case Dynamic efficiency of Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) instruments … 
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SC where the increase is statistically significant but is quite low. It means that the incentive 
effect on innovation is not sufficient to trigger radical innovations in eco-design activities 
(even in the SC case). This result is in line with the proposition of Heaton (1997) and Kemp 
and Pontoglio (2008) according to which the capacity of economic instruments to favour 
radical technological change is empirically limited.  
In terms of market efficiency, it is obvious that recycling fees have a significant impact 
on prices and that this impact is higher when the fees are paid by consumers. This pressure on 
prices tends to decrease market demand which explains the decrease in firms' profits. When 
the recycling fee is paid by firms, the negative impact on profits is higher which also affects 
the market dynamics and so the level of concentration, even if the failure rate of firms is not 
significantly modified. 
The results on the effects of recycling fees can be summarized by the following 
proposition: 
In order to be efficient in terms of innovation incentives, recycling fees should be 
specific to firms and proportional to the recyclability of products. Individualized recycling 
fees paid by consumers seem to be the best compromise in terms of its impact upon innovation 
and product characteristics. Nevertheless the dynamic efficiency of this type of policy 
instrument is limited in the sense that it does not bring radical innovations in product design. 
A trade-off must be found since a recycling fee system entails a significant increase in price 
and so may affect consumers' surplus. 
As to the impact of norms, the results presented in table 2 confirm what we observed in 
the representative simulation, that is to say that environmental efficiency is higher with 
Norm1 than with Norm2. The selection of the “greenest” products in the most stringent case 
leads to a significant decrease in virgin materials flows. In both cases, recycling rate 
significantly increases and the level of unrecycled waste decreases, but the effects are larger 
with Norm1. 
In terms of R&D and innovation, the results show that the introduction of recyclability 
norms (whatever the sanction mechanism) entails a significant change in firms' R&D strategy 
which tends to be more concentrated on product recyclability. This change in R&D strategy 
effectively leads to a significant improvement in the level of recyclability of products, which 
means that firms innovate efficiently on this characteristic. The impact of recyclability norms 
on innovation is all the more significant that we can observe that the proportion of firms 
changing the design of their products is significantly augmented. These results stress that the 
introduction of norms is able to entail more frequent changes in product design. So globally, 
we can say that recyclability norms achieve their objectives in terms of dynamic efficiency. 
It is striking to observe that the effects on innovation and product designs are higher in 
the case of Norm1 than with Norm2, which suggest that the degree of stringency of the norm, 
in particular the sanction mechanism, is an important determinant of the capacity of the norm 
to induce radical innovations. This result confirms the idea according to which only stringent 
command and control instruments can lead to radical innovations, while economic 
instruments and more flexible regulations tend to trigger mainly incremental innovations and 
diffusion of existing technologies (Heaton, 1997; Ashford, 2000; Kemp and Pontoglio, 2008). 
This argument is well illustrated by our model which shows that a stringent norm associated 
with a sanction mechanism based on market restriction acts as a strong market selection 
resulting in the “selection of the greenest” and in radical changes in product designs. In this 
very stringent case, the impact of norms on innovation is due more to a selection effect than to 
the sole incentive effect.  
In our model, this selection effect reinforces the Schumpeterian trade-off by Dynamic efficiency of Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) instruments … 
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mechanically leading to an increase in profits which enables firms to increase their R&D 
investment. This result is important to stress that, when there is cumulativeness and increasing 
returns in innovation, stringent norms can be a way of strengthening cumulativeness and 
“success breeds success” phenomena. Totally this favours radical innovation and dynamic 
efficiency, while increasing market concentration. Notably in the most stringent case 
(Norm1), by acting as a selection device, the norm entails an important increase in the level of 
concentration and in the failure rate of firms. This can be considered as a negative effect in 
terms of competition and static efficiency but, on the other hand, norms do not bring about 
any increase in price which tones down the previous argument.  
The results on the impact of recycling norms can be summarized by the following 
proposition: 
By acting as a strong selection device, stringent recycling norms (Norm1) bring about 
radical innovations in product design and a global improvement in product quality (i.e. over 
the three characteristics). In terms of environmental and dynamic efficiency, stringent norms 
appear to be the most efficient instrument.  
Table 3 summarizes the relative effects of each policy design. 
Table 3. Comparison of instruments 
 Norm1  Norm2  SC  SF  HC  HF 
Environmental efficiency 
- Recycling rate 
- Decrease in quantities of 
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 (++ high positive impact, + significant positive impact, 0 no significant impact, -- high negative impact, - significant 
negative impact) 
3.3. Sensitivity analysis to regulation parameters 
In this section, we investigate the impact of regulation parameters on the main variables 
with the help of regression trees
21 (figure 5). A regression tree (Venables and Ripley, 1999) 
establishes a hierarchy between independent variables using their contributions to the overall 
fit (R²) of the regression. The tree gives a hierarchical sequence of conditions on the variables 
of the model: the higher the role of a condition in the classification of the observed case, the 
higher its status on the tree. For each condition, the left branch gives the cases for which the 
condition is true and the right branch gives the cases compatible with the complementary 
condition
22. 
                                                 
21 In each regulation case, we only investigate regression trees related to variables significantly impacted by 
regulation. 
22 For example, in Figure 5-a (Inverse Herfindahl index – Norm1), on the left branch, we have all observations 
for which NormRate ≥ 0.9143. On the right branch, we have all observations for which NormRate < 0.9143. Dynamic efficiency of Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) instruments … 
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Figure 5. Regression trees  
 


















Figure 5-c. Regression trees of firms’ R&D strategy (Share invested in product 










                                                                                                                                                          
When 0.7937 ≤ NormRate < 0.9143 and Start ≥ 48.5, the expected value for the inverse Herfindahl index is 
4.082 and we have n = 1910 observations corresponding to this case. 
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Regression trees enable us to identify the parameters of each policy instrument which 
are the most influential on the dynamics of the model. For each policy instrument, the degree 
of stringency, which can be measured by the norm rate as well as by the fine rate and the fee 
rate, is determining. In the case of Norm1, we observe that the norm rate, which is the 
parameter determining the level of the recyclability norm (cf. equation 11), determines 
strongly the impact of the norm on market concentration, on the recycling rate as well as on 
radical innovation (i.e. share of firms developing a new product design) (cf. figures 5-a, 5-b 
and 5-d). In the case of Norm2, it is the stringency of the sanction mechanism represented by 
the fine rate (cf. equation 12) which influences the effects of the norm (cf. figures 5-a, 5-b and 
5-d). Globally the more stringent the norms, the higher their environmental and dynamic 
efficiency.  
In the case of recycling fees, if we concentrate on the most efficient design which is SC, 
we observe that the stringency of the design (high FeeRate) tends to increase the impact of the 
instrument on the recycling rate, on product design change and on the share of R&D on 
recyclability (cf. figures 5-b to 5-d). Again it suggests that the level of stringency has a 
positive effect upon environmental efficiency and upon innovative effects of the considered 
instrument.  
Another parameter which appears to be very influential is the date of introduction of the 
policy instrument (Start). In the case of fees, we observe that an early introduction of 
regulation will favour changes in firms’ innovation strategies (figures 5-b and 5-c). But in the 
case of norms, a later introduction of regulation will have a higher impact on market 
concentration (figure 5-a) as well as on environmental variables (figure 5-d) and innovation 
(figure 5-b and 5-c). This result is explained by the way regulation instruments are modelled. 
When the simulation starts, every firm has the same product recyclability which will increase 
over time depending on the specific firm’s innovation strategy and economic performance. 
Consequently, the differences in product recyclability tend to increase over time. The 
effective level of the norm being based on the highest product recyclability on the market (c.f. 
equation 11), the later the norm comes into play, the more stringent it will be and so the 
harder it will be for firms to comply with the regulatory requirement. This will tend to 
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increase the number of failures and then market concentration. Surviving firms will then 
increase their market share and profits leading them to develop more easily an eco-designed 
product (figure 5-b) which will favour recycling rate (figure 5-d).  
These results on the date of introduction of norms are linked to the debate on the timing 
of environmental policy. The basic question boils down to the question about who is the first 
to move, the regulator or the firms. As summarized by Requate (2005), a myopic regulator 
does not anticipate new technology and therefore commits ex ante to a level of policy 
instrument which is optimal given the conventional technology. On the contrary, we speak 
about ex post regulation when the firms move first by engaging in R&D and by innovating in 
new technology, and the regulator moves second by adapting the level of the policy 
instrument to the respective R&D outcome. By definition, ex post regulation is always time 
consistent. Even if the literature usually considers the regulator as the natural first mover, 
more recent contributions show the importance of the regulator's reaction on innovation. Our 
model confirms that the dynamic efficiency of norms depends on the time of their 
introduction and that an ex post or a late introduction tends to be more efficient because it 
leaves more time for firms to innovate and improve their technology. With regression trees, 
we can see that it is the consistency between the stringency of the norm and its date of 
introduction which determines the final outcome: for example, the impact of a stringent norm 
on the share of firms developing a product design for recyclability is higher when the norm is 
introduced later (cf. figure 5-b).  
Regression trees also bring statistical support to make comparative tests across policy 
instruments. They highlight that the efficiency of policy instruments will depend strongly on 
the value of their parameter settings. Starting from a given parameter setting, a policy 
instrument which appears to be the more relevant to achieve a given objective can be 
outperformed by an other policy instrument with a different parameter setting. Regression 
trees enable us to emphasize some threshold effects and to stress three particular findings: 
-  In the previous section, norms were found to favour radical change towards eco-
designed product. However, we can notice (figure 5-b) that  SC-type fees with high 
minimum level (FeeRate ≥ 0.5795) can have the same effect on radical innovations in 
product design than early introduced Norm1-type norms with a quite low requirement 
level (NormRate < 0.8307 and Start   < 80.5), and in addition they can be more 
effective than most configurations of Norm2-type norms;  
-  When investigating change in firms’ innovation strategy towards product 
recyclability, firm specific fees seem to be in general more incentive than norms, but 
trees (figure 5-c) highlight that stringent norms (NormRate ≥ 0.7964 for Norm1 and 
NormRate ≥ 0.9346 for Norm2) can lead to greater changes than lately introduced 
specific fees (Start ≥ 161.5);  
-  Regarding environmental performances, norms lead in average to greater recycling 
rates. Nevertheless, we can notice (figure 5-d) that quite lately introduced SC-type 
fees (Start ≥ 104.5) can be more effective than norms with a quite low stringency 
level (NormRate < 0.8307 for Norm1 and FineRate < 0.4797 for Norm2). 
To conclude, our results show that it is very difficult to draw general comparative 
results on the relative efficiency of recycling fees and norms. In particular, the dynamic 
efficiency of a given policy instrument depends on its parameter settings and on the 
consistency between stringency and timing. For those reasons, there are some threshold 
effects such that, under certain parameter settings, a stringent fee system can be more efficient 
than flexible norms.  
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4. Conclusion 
We developed an original agent-based model to investigate the impacts of recycling 
fees and norms upon firms’ innovative strategy and market structure. This model provides a 
simplified vision of the problem studied. In fact, many aspects of reality have been 
intentionally neglected and, needless to say, some hypotheses being assumed here are fairly 
restricted. However, despite this simplification in the modelling, our simulations yield some 
interesting conclusions about the effects of policy instruments on industrial dynamics. 
Concerning recycling fees, the model dynamics show that only a firm-specific recycling 
fee, i.e. proportional to the recyclability of each product, would encourage firms to change 
their R&D strategy towards more recyclable products. A homogeneous fee, i.e. identical for 
all the firms, will not be an incentive instrument. This result emphasizes that to be efficient 
incentives must be differentiated across firms in order to take into account technological 
diversity and to reward the most innovative firms.  
Secondly, depending on the distribution of policy costs, i.e. who are the agents paying 
the fee, the instrument can lead to lower or higher environmental performance. In fact, when 
firms have to face the fee, product recyclability tends to be lower (because of the negative 
impact on profits). Ultimately, the model dynamics show that an individualized fee paid by 
consumers would be the most effective instrument. 
More frequent radical changes in product design appear with recyclability norms. 
Simulation results show that norms encourage firms to shift their innovation strategy towards 
improvements in the recyclability of their products. They will adopt greener paths leading 
them to market eco-designed products. These results are in line with the proposal that 
command and control instruments would be more appropriate when technological 
improvements require radical innovation (Ashford et al., 1985 ; Ashford, 2000, 2002 ; Taylor 
et al., 2005 ; Frondel et al., 2007 ; Kemp and Pontoglio, 2008).  
Nevertheless, selection mechanisms and incentives introduced with norms will have 
limited effect on firm innovation strategies because they relate only to offending firms. Once 
the minimum level of recyclability is achieved, the norm is not a constraint anymore for 
firms. Moreover due to those selection mechanisms, our results show that implementing a 
norm reinforces the Schumpeterian trade-off between innovation and market concentration. 
Since selection will increase market concentration and reduce diversity, only the firms 
complying with the standard will take full advantage of environmental innovation offsets. 
Win-win effects (in the sense of Porter and Van der Linde (1995)) will come into play only 
for those firms, while the others will perceive regulation as a threat.  
The model dynamics emphasize that technology responses to regulatory pressure are not 
simple responses. They involve multiple compromises and trade-offs between the different 
characteristics of products and will have different impacts on firms' innovative strategy and 
upon market structure depending on how the policy instrument is formulated and used. Our 
experiments confirm the proposition of Kemp and Pontoglio (2008) that policy instruments 
are complex objects and the effects of any policy are linked to the design of the instrument 
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Appendix 






 Parameter/Variable  Initial  value  Description 
N  [5 ; 15]  Initial number of firms 
Xmax 1  Maximum  technical  quality 
LTmax1  [1 ; 5]  Maximum product-life with initial product 
design 
Rmax1  [0.2 ; 1]  Maximum recyclability with initial product 
design 
LTmax2  5  Maximum product-life with eco-design 
Rmax2  1  Maximum recyclability with eco-design 
AC
LT  [200 ; 600]  Switching cost related to the adoption of a 
product design for durability 
AC
R  [200 ; 600]  Switching cost related to the adoption of a 
product design for recycling 
Length_AC
LT  [10 ; 30] 
Number of periods over which a switching 
cost must be borne when the firm adopts a 
product design for durability 
Length_AC
R  [10 ; 30] 
Number of periods over which a switching 
cost must be borne when the firm adopts a 
product design for recycling 
pr  [3 ; 6]  Price of recycled inputs 
Market 
pv  [3 ; 6]  Price of virgin inputs 
λ 1  Mark-up 
X 0.2  Initial  technical  quality 
LT 1  Initial  product-life 
R 0.2 Initial  recyclability 




R  [0 ; 1] with δ
X + δ
LT + δ
R  = 1 
Initial share of R&D expenditure invested 
respectively in product technical quality 
improvement, in product-life extension and 
in product recyclability improvement 
  [0 ; 1]  Rate at which the research level adjusts the 
R&D expenditure of the current period 
γ1, γ2, γ3  [0 ; 1] with γ1 + γ2 + γ3 = 1 
Impact, respectively, of the research level, 
of the exhaustion in innovation 
opportunities, of the cumulated experience 
and on the improvement of the considered 
characteristic 
k 0.03    Maximum probability to change innovation 
strategy 
Firm 
Imitate 0.97  Propensity to imitate the strategy of 
competitors 
GreenShare  Drawn from the normal distribution 
N(0.25 ; 0.2)  Share of green consumers 
β1, β2, β3 
[0 ; 1] with β1 + β2 + β3 = 1  
β1 < β3 for green consumers  
β1 > β3 for non-green consumers 
Sensitivity of the products’ visibility 
towards respectively product technical 
quality, inverse product use cost and 
product recyclability 
β4  [0 ; 0.5]  Sensitivity of the products’ visibility 
towards product market share 
Consumer 
x  [0.35 ; 0.95]  Maximum obsolescence probability 
μrec  [0.1 ; 0.2]  Share of recycler profits invested in R&D 
δrec  [0 ; 1]  Share of recycler R&D expenditure to 
improve the quality of recycled materials 
CFrec  [150 ; 450]  Recycler's fixed costs 
Recycler 
crec  3  Initial value for recycler’s marginal cost 
Start  [1 ; 250]  Period the regulation comes into force 
FeeRate  [0.4 ; 0.6]  Minimum value for the recycling fee 
NormRate  [0.5 ; 1]  Parameter reflecting the level of norm 
Regulation 
FineRate  [0 ; 1]  Parameter reflecting the level of fine 
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Table 2. Chosen value for parameters of the single simulation run 
 
 Parameter/Variable  Initial  value  Description 
N 8 Initial  number  of  firms 
Xmax 1 Maximum  technical  quality 
LTmax1 3  Maximum product-life with initial product 
design 
Rmax1 0.6  Maximum recyclability with initial product 
design 
LTmax2  5  Maximum product-life with eco-design 
Rmax2  1  Maximum recyclability with eco-design 
AC
LT 300  Switching cost related to the adoption of a 
product design for durability 
AC
R 300  Switching cost related to the adoption of a 
product design for recycling 
Length_AC
LT 15 
Number of periods over which a switching 
cost must be borne when the firm adopts a 
product design for durability 
Length_AC
R 15 
Number of periods over which a switching 
cost must be borne when the firm adopts a 
product design for recycling 
pr  4.5  Price of recycled inputs 
Market 
pv  4.5  Price of virgin inputs 
λ 1  Mark-up 
X 0.2 Initial  technical  quality 
LT 1  Initial  product-life 
R 0.2  Initial  recyclability 
μ  0.2  Share of profits invested in R&D 
δ
X 
Firm 1 and 2: 0.2 
Firm 3 and 4: 0.2 
Firm 5 and 6: 0.6 
Firm 7 and 8: 0.334 
Initial share of R&D expenditure invested in 
product technical quality improvement 
δ
LT 
Firm 1 and 2: 0.2 
Firm 3 and 4: 0.6 
Firm 5 and 6: 0.2 
Firm 7 and 8: 0.333 




Firm 1 and 2: 0.6 
Firm 3 and 4: 0.2 
Firm 5 and 6: 0.2 
Firm 7 and 8: 0.333 
Initial share of R&D expenditure invested in 
product recyclability improvement 
  0.5  Rate at which the research level adjusts the 
R&D expenditure of the current period 
γ1 0.6  Impact of the research level on the 
improvement of the considered characteristic 
γ2 0.3 
Impact of the exhaustion in innovation 
opportunities on the improvement of the 
considered characteristic 
γ3 0.1  Impact of the cumulated experience on the 
improvement of the considered characteristic 
k 0,03    Maximum probability to change innovation 
strategy 
Firm 
Imitate 0,97  Propensity to imitate the strategy of 
competitors 
GreenShare  0.1  Share of green consumers 
β1  0.6 for green consumers 
0.1 for non-green consumers 
Sensitivity of the products’ visibility towards 
product technical quality 
β2 0.3  Sensitivity of the products’ visibility towards 
inverse product use cost 
β3  0.1 for green consumers 
0.6 for non-green consumers 
Sensitivity of the products’ visibility towards 
product recyclability 
β4  0.25  Sensitivity of the products’ visibility towards 
product market share 
Consumer 
x  0.5 for green consumers 
0.8 for non-green consumers  Maximum obsolescence probability 
μrec  0.2  Share of recycler profits invested in R&D 
δrec 0.5  Share of recycler R&D expenditure to 
improve the quality of recycled materials 
CFrec  300  Recycler's fixed costs 
Recycler 
crec  3  Initial value for recycler’s marginal cost 
Start  100  Period the regulation comes into force 
FeeRate  0.45  Minimum value for the recycling fee 
NormRate  0.75  Parameter reflecting the level of norm 
Regulation 
FineRate  0.65  Parameter reflecting the level of fine 
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  Firm 1  Firm 2  Firm3  Firm 4  Firm 5  Firm 6  Firm 7  Firm 8 
SR    
t = 466 
LTmax1 
crossing 
t = 225 
LTmax1 
crossing 
t = 360 
LTmax1 
crossing 
   
Norm1 




t = 101 
norm 
t = 101 
norm 
t = 101 
norm 
  
t = 101 
norm 
Norm2    
t = 187 
fine 
t = 239 
LTmax1 
crossing 
t = 363 
LTmax1 
crossing 




t = 165 
fine 
HC     
t = 241 
LTmax1 
crossing 
    
HF    
t = 479 
LTmax1 
crossing 
t = 291 
LTmax1 
crossing 
    
SC    
t = 415 
LTmax1 
crossing 








SF     
t = 292 
LTmax1 
crossing 
t = 373 
LTmax1 
crossing 




t: time period at which the firm exits the market 
Failure causes:  
LTmax1 crossing: negative profits because of the adoption costs the firm has to face when it crosses the threshold 
LTmax1 and changes its product design to develop a long lifetime product 
Rmax1 crossing: negative profits because of the adoption costs the firm has to face when it crosses the threshold 
Rmax1 and changes its product design to develop a highly recyclable product 
norm: the firm must exit the market because its product recyclability is lower than the norm 
fine: negative profits because of the fine the firm must pay since its product recyclability is lower than the norm 
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